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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
llUANE ROYLANCE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
- vs. ~TEPHEN L. DA VIES,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No..

10641

APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN ANSWER TO
HESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
This brief is in response to the argument and authoritips rdie<l upon by Respondent in his brief in support
nt a P!'tition for Rehearing.
R('spondent 's Petition states:
"This Court, in its opinion, applied the rule
that our guest statute released the operator of an
automobile from responsibility for injuries to a
gratuitous guest unless the operator intended tlw
accident to occur."
ln ~upport of this assertion, Respondent quotes excerpts
(Int of context from the Court's opinion.

2
The Court did not so hold. Tl1e ma·JOfl·t y

npilllf))l

reaffirms Stack v. Kearnes 118 Utah 237, 221 P. 2d 50!
(1950) and the test laid down by that decision in tJi1,
following language :
"Willful misconduct connotes a greatn
wrongdoing than mere negligence or ewn gl'O~.,
negligence. It includes a conscious or intentioual
violation of definite law or rule of conduct wilJ 1
the knowledge of the peril to be apprehended
from such act or failure to act.

• • •

"The intentional doing of an act or intrntional
omitting or failing to do an act, with knowlPdg1'
that serious injury is a probable and not merely
a possible result, or the intentional doing of ai;
act with wanton and reckless disregard of the
possible consequences. It involves deliberate intentional or wanton conduct in doing or omitting
to do an act with knowldege or appreciation th&t
injury is likely to result therefrom."
It was the holding of this Court in the instant case that

under this test there was "no evidence of willful mis
conduct in the record to sustain the verdict'' for the
Respondent.
Section 500(b) Restatement (Second), Torts cik1l
by Respondent in no way detracts from and in fad
supports the position of this Court in the presPnt

ra~e.

3
R.Pspondent's authority in support of his Petition
\'or HPhearing is primarily a special concurring opinion

in 8 n OrPgon case and a section from a treatise disrll~sing the theory and weaknesses of guest statutes.
'J'he case of Burghardt v. Watson, 349 P.2d 792 (Ore.,
1~60) quoted by Respondent involved an action for per:nnal injuries sustained by the plaintiff when the defendant driver's vehicle went out of control after rounding a curve in the highway. The Oregon court held
that tliP evidence, including the driver's alleged violation
of the speed limit, was insufficient to warrant a finding
of gross negligence on the driver's part to allow recovery
i!llder the guest statute. The court mentioned that there
was nothing in the record to indicate ari"I don't care
what happens attitude" which could transmute the defendant's ordinary negligence, if any, into gross negli-

Respondent in his brief quotes the full text of Judge
O'Connell's special concurring opinion except for the
last paragraph which reads:
"In my opinion, there was not sufficient evidence in the present case from which the jury
could justifiably conclude that defendant's conduct was reckless ·within the meaning of O.RS.
:10J 10. Therefore, I concur."
.Judge 0 'Connell pointed out that "the full consciousness that a risk is to be encountered will not result in

4

reckless conduct if the probability of harm is ~light
01
if the probability is great but the harm wl 1id 1 11 i1r
probably result is not serious." He statPd that t]i
ingredient lacking in the Burglwrdt casp was a ]1j.,],
degree of probability that serious harm would n•:rnh
Therefore, in spite of all the dirta, .Judge O'Connf'!:
concurred in holding there was not suffieiPnt eyid1·nc·
to reach even the level of .r1rnss 11e9ligencc and IYvrr.,,iJ
as a matter of law the judgment in favor of tlw plaintilt
,
1

.~'

1

In the second to last paragraph in his coneunin:;
opinion, Judge O'Connell pointed out the position ()['a
court with regard to the theory and application 1Jf a
guest statute:
"Perhaps the tim<::• has come whPn tlt(' jun
should be permitted to treat automobile gnPct~
in the same mannPr as it treats otlwr injmP:!
plaintiffs; but that changP must come from th1
legislature, not from us."
Five months aftf'r tlw Burphardt opm1on 11n'
handed down, the Oregon Supreme Court \\'a,..; ap;ai11
faced with the guest statutP in M cN a!Jb L Delm11w11. 3:i~
P. 2d 290 (Ore., 1960). That case has been set fortl1
at page 16 of Appellant's original brief in this adi(Jn.
The Oregon Supreme Court with Judge O'Connell joi1 1
ing, held that the defendant's conduct did not awurnit
to gross negligence stating among other things tluil
"poor judgment viewed from hindsight is not enough t11
constitute gross negligence."

5
Aftrr the lengthy theoretical discussion quoted by
llc:;pomlcnt from Harper and Jam es on Torts, those
authors conclude in the last paragraph of that portion
quuted that :
"When we come to consider the kind of showmg which courts will regard as sufficient to
warrant a finding of liability under guest statutes,
there is far greater uniformity than there is as
to theory or proper language for instructions."
CON CL l!SION

'I'he opinion of the Court in this case is a correct
awlication of Utah law and not a departure therefrom
~'claimed by Respondent. An attack upon guest statutes
rn goll~ral is insufficient to support a rehearing in this

Respectfully submitted,
SKEEN, WORSLEY,
SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
701 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for
Defendant and Appellant

